Sub-Saharan African states urgently need expanded and more dynamic private sectors, more efficient and effective infrastructure/utility provision, and increased investment from both domestic and foreign sources. Privatization is one way to address these problems. But African states have generally been slow and reluctant privatizers; a good percentage of industrial/manufacturing and most infrastructure still remains in state hands. Given prevailing public hostility towards privatization, and widespread institutional weaknesses, such caution is defensible, but nonetheless very costly. The long-run and difficult solution is the creation and reinforcement of the institutions that underpin and guide proper market operations. In the interim, African governments and donors have little choice but to continue to experiment with the use of externally supplied substitutes for gaps in local regulatory and legal systems.
1 Tariffs rose to levels covering variable costs, revenues of the water company rose by a factor of ten, and the World Bank subsidy ended. Sixty-four percent of customers billed paid their fees, (Shirley, 2002, 22) a modest rate compared to international norms, but much improved over past collection achievements. Compared to failed earlier attempts to reform the system without the involvement of the private sector, all this was impressive. But a number of major concerns remained.
First, by 1997 the price per m 3 stood at US$ 0.83, a near seven-fold increase from 1989, and more than 40 times the 1986 price. The price was very high in comparison to most OECD countries, much less African neighbors 2 , and was considerably higher than in most other lease/concession arrangements in Asia and Latin America (where smaller increases had often provoked street protests). A cross subsidy scheme allowed small volume users to pay less than large, but both the reduction in price per m 3 and the monthly amount to which the lower price applied were smaller than in most other countries. (Shirley, 2002, 15) Post-privatization, an essential commodity had become less affordable. 1 Improving water quality can have a large social impact. In Argentina, improvements in water quality in the 30% of municipalities with privatized provision led to declines in infant mortality, from water borne diseases alone, by 5 to 9%, versus areas where water continued to be supplied by publicly operated firms. The poorer the area, the greater the impact; poorest neighborhoods saw declines in infant mortality of up to 24%. See Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2002) . 2 In Abidjan in the neighboring Ivory Coast, the privatized water company offered an average price in 1997 of US $0.54/ m 3 .
3 Less affordable for some; the distributional impact of the price increase is unclear. Most poor people in Guinea were not and still are not hooked up to the water network; those connected are probably from the middle and upper income strata. A price rise for these consumers, even substantial, may have a limited direct effect on either inequality or poverty. But it is also quite likely that increased prices in the formal water network have been passed on to many poor consumers, at least in urban areas-who often get their water from vendors (whose prices are always much higher per unit than from a formal connection to the network).
Second, while the physical network expanded, the rate of growth was less than anticipated. Unlike more recent leases and concessions around the world, this contract did not place investment responsibility in private hands, and it did not specify expansion and connection targets for the SOE that retained responsibility for enlarging the network.
Third, the amount of unaccounted water remained well above 40 %. Government costumers did pay for service a bit more regularly than before, but many government offices remained in arrears to the provider-and the private company did not cut service to any central government unit, even though this was expressly permitted in its contract.
Had water losses and billing and collection been more aggressively addressed, revenues would have increased, and prices might have fallen--but under the lease agreement the private provider had no overwhelming incentive to push for such improvements.
This was largely due to a fourth factor: The government was still very much involved in key parts of the water business, and its performance continued to be weak.
The experienced private operator apparently had little difficulty persuading the inexperienced government regulators to accept price hikes. It may be that the private provider found it easier to negotiate tariff increases than to collect aggressively. 4 In any event, since all commercial risk was borne by the government, the private manager was free to select the path of least resistance, constrained only by the competence and dynamism of the government regulatory agency. The question then becomes: Did regulators 5 capture-for consumers-a reasonable share of the financial benefits arising from the efficiency gains produced post-lease? The answer depends on the "counterfactual;" what would have happened had the contract not been let, had the public sector remained in control? As discussed below, careful students of the process conclude that private involvement produced superior results, despite the large price increases. 4 The private provider would argue, with justification, that the high price was legitimate given government's inability to expand the network as expected, to permit service termination to customers in arrears-i.e., to hold up its side of the bargain-and the reluctance of local courts to allow the water firm to sanction customers who failed to pay. 5 In Guinea, regulation of the contract was placed in the hands of the "rump" SOE that had formerly managed the water supply, not in a new, separate, legally defined and empowered regulatory body.
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Thus, in sum, the lease produced gains, including gains to general consumers; but these were less than expected, and they came at a slow pace and quite a high cost.
II. African Privatization: The record to date
The Guinea water story reflects in miniature Africa's struggle with privatization, particularly in infrastructure, where one finds the largest and most economically important SOEs. The general story is this: Poor service provision by loss-making public enterprises led first to reforms short of private sector involvement. These produced no, modest, or unsustainable improvements. Financial losses mounted. They led to further deterioration in service quantity and quality, and increased burdens on the government budget. IMF involvement and surveillance led to a choking off of direct budgetary financing of SOEs. In most cases the banking system, initially state-owned or dominated, then took on the task of financing the enterprises. Debts were incurred but not serviced.
The banks rapidly accumulated a non-performing portfolio and severe solvency problems. Financing/fiscal problems grew acute. These, and not efficiency concerns per se, became the principal driver of SOE reform. Typically, it was the IMF that highlighted the issue and insisted upon efforts to resolve it. In response, private sector management, financing or ownership was proposed. The World Bank then became more directly involved, in terms of reform/privatization design, and assistance in implementation.
In many, probably most African countries, the principal motivation for privatization has been to placate the IFIs. African governments do increasingly recognize the SOE problem; and numerous African leaders and observers preach the gospel of financial discipline and market-oriented reform. Still, commitment to privatization as the best way to solve SOE problems has been neither widespread not strong. Most African leaders and officials would prefer that the SOE problem be addressed by means other than ownership change.
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A review of the scope and pace of African privatization supports this allegation. Table 2 ).
learned. The government feared losing its commanding heights; the people feared the loss of the enterprises their hard-earned taxes had supported. Those fearful of private enterprise saw the new owners dismantling the parastatals and cashing in on the rewards. Even supporters of privatization saw parastatal managers stripping the firms and cashing in whatever was saleable." (333) 7 And if one removes from the list of 29 countries (for which one can estimate the percentage of the SOE portfolio divested) the six leaders in terms of numbers of firms sold-Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Togo and Zambia-the fraction of SOE stock privatized falls to about ¼ . Thirteen of these 29 countries have privatized less than 30 % of their SOE portfolios; only 6 have divested more than 75%. 8 Note that most of the 2300 sales were completed by 1997; since then, in line with the worldwide decline in investor interest in emerging markets, the number of privatizations in Africa has fallen below 100 per year. 9 In contrast, privatization revenues in Italy alone, in the period 1990-2001, totaled $112 bn USD, and even New Zealand-ranking 10 th on an OECD list of privatizing states, and with a population of less than 4 million-generated more from privatization in this period than did all 37 African countries. (Source: Mahboobi [2002] , 46) Moreover, African privatization revenues may be significantly overestimated; in a number of countries buyers have failed to make payment on transactions already recorded as complete. 
Average: 40%
Sources: This and all other tables based on a compilation and updating of the data bases conducted by Thierry Buchs, IFC, 2002 . They are drawn from World Bank Africa Region Privatization Database, World Bank, 2002; WDI database 1991 WDI database -2000 IMF Staff Country Reports, 1998 and Tables 3 and 4 , below) Governments claim that retained shares are weapons with which to protect the public interest against rascally or incompetent buyers. Moreover, they often hope to sell the retained shares later at a much higher price, after the new private partner has driven up value. Whether share retention actually achieves these goals is debatable. What is not in doubt is that continued government involvement and share retention reduces the number of bidders and therefore the price per share sold. The slow pace of sales, the reluctance to place the highest-potential assets on the market, the failure to sell all shares, poor business and legal environments, and the deficiencies of government regulation and administration--all combine to place African states in a dead heat with Middle Eastern and North
African countries for the title of "region with the least foreign investment in 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 (2001): He lists the policy, regulatory and institutional requisites for electricity privatization to be effective. In their absence "…reform of the….state-owned ESI to improve autonomy, accountability, and financial viability, may be the only option. The fact that such reforms have failed in the past does not make it wise to encourage irreversible reforms of unproven worth, and privatisation in unpropitious circumstances may be even more costly than the unsatisfactory status quo." (pp. 43-4) No African case is discussed in Newbery's paper. See also Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat, who argue that in transition states, at least, ownership change must be accompanied by a threshold level of what they termed "agency-related" institutional reforms of the type listed above. If this modicum level of contracting and incentive reforms is not present, then ownership change may produce no or even negative effects. Conversely, institutional change by itself is also insufficient to generate economic performance improvements "unless enough change-of-title privatization has already occurred." (p. 54) 11 Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) argue that "the quality of institutions 'trumps' everything else" in explaining economic development outcomes. But they note that the argument is at such a high level of abstraction as to provide little or no guidance to policymakers.
14 sabotage SOE reform, privatization in particular. Of course, they make their case not by complaining about potential harm to their material interests, but rather by pointing to perceived economic, financial and social shortcomings of privatization. On what grounds do they make their case?
III. Post-privatization Performance
Rigorous assessments of privatization are increasingly available in Latin American, transition, OECD and Asian countries. Such studies are relatively rare in was hailed by the World Bank as "the most successful" in Africa. (Campbell-White and Bhatia, 1998, 111) But four years later, many Zambians clearly perceive privatization as almost entirely negative, and they are putting pressure on government to rethink the policy. Privatization is alleged to have:
• been imposed and micromanaged by the IFIs, without sufficient attention to requisite policy or regulatory frameworks, and with minimal involvement of Zambian citizens,
• resulted in the closure of many firms previously run by Zambians (there is particular resentment that many that continued or reopened are in the hands of foreigners, particularly South Africans),
• added greatly to unemployment-and thus poverty and inequality-at a time when job opportunities are declining drastically,
• increased the incidence of corruption (there is widespread suspicion that the proceeds from sales have been unreported and misused), and in general
• benefited the rich, the foreign, the agile and politically well-connected (see Craig, 2000) at the expense of the poor, the domestic, the honest and the unaffiliated-as illustrated by the allegation that new private owners extract subsidies and tax concessions from government.
Zambians claim that the IFIs were originally uninterested in assisting them to deal with the negative social effects of privatization (severance packages, retraining schemes, monitoring contractual obligations of new owners), and that even now they only pay serious attention to such matters when they are expressly involved in a specific transaction; i.e., when the World Bank's private sector affiliate, the IFC, is one of the investors/purchasers, or when an IMF condition mandates movement on the sale of a major firm.
The sentiments of Zambian opinion-makers toward liberalization in general, and privatization in particular, are summarized in an editorial in The Post (of Lusaka;
11.28.02):
The hardships Zambians are going through are primarily a consequence of ... neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization. ... While it cannot be denied that corruption, extravagance and lack of priorities have considerably aggravated the situation, we shouldn't forget that these factors are a product of this whole system -they are inherent problems of these policies. These IMF and World Bank policies breed corruption, extravagance and lack of priorities in our leaders and indeed our people. ... And despite having liberalized its markets, as dictated by the IMF and the World Bank, Zambia has still not started benefiting from it. What our country needs now is to think through its strategies and that primarily involves freeing itself from the IMF and World Bank indirect rule and start to direct the affairs of this country in the best interests of our people, and not the major shareholders of these institutions. Why should we privatize Zambia National Commercial Bank, Zesco Limited (electricity) and Zamtel (telecommunications) simply because the IMF and the World Bank want us to do so even when the great majority of Zambians are opposed to it because they believe it is not in their best interest? ... The success of IMF and World Bank policies over any alternative model of social development is a matter of propaganda than fact. If humans prevail, alternative policies to the IMF and World Bank's programs will be found and implemented. The main thing is to have a political leadership that has a clear understanding of today's neoliberal world and can stand firm.
This encapsulates the views, prevalent in Zambia and widespread in Africa as a whole, that privatization has been forced upon Zambia by the IFIs, not produced the economic benefits it was supposed to deliver-and indeed imposed substantial costsand increased the level of corruption. Are these allegations accurate?
Pro…
In 2001, the Zambian Privatization Agency commissioned a study to assess the effects of privatization. It found that 235 of the 254 firms privatized since 1991 continued in operation at the time of the study; not a bad achievement given the very poor financial state of these enterprises prior to divestiture, and the dismal business environment prevailing in the country throughout the 1990s. In terms of numbers of sales, 57 % of the buyers were Zambian citizens, and an additional 13 % were joint ventures between Zambians and foreigners; the remaining 30 % of sales were to foreigners (many of whom had been minority equity partners in SOEs and who held, and exercised, pre-emptive rights on the sales of shares). However, by value, Zambians account for just 5 % of sales, joint ventures 83 % and totally foreign purchasers 12 %. A scheme to "warehouse" a minority stake of shares in privatized firms and float them later to Zambian buyers has had but minimal success. Some of the most visible firms, such as the breweries, went to South African owners (who have turned them into profitable ventures).
A prime rationale for privatization is the inability of government to access investment capital for renewal and expansion of SOEs: In the non-mining firms reviewed, post-privatization capital expenditures totaled more than $400 million USD.
Nineteen firms, or 7.5 % of those privatized, closed following privatization, a fact much lamented in Zambia-though a 7.5 % failure rate is less than small and medium business failure rates in most advanced industrial economies. Seven of the 19 subsequently resumed operations after being re-sold, and similar efforts were underway in an additional five-leaving only seven firms definitively closed.
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And a number of company closures sometimes cited as evidence of the failure of privatization were either firms that had always been private, or SOEs.
In the privatized non-mining firms, employment declined from 28,000 at time of There is less clarity and far more controversy about the fate of the 34,000 workers employed in the privatized mining sector. A highly publicized and troubling issue for the privatization program is that two large mines-Luanshya and Baluba-were sold to a bidder who agreed not to dismiss any of the 7,000 workers. The parent mining SOE, ZCCM, 17 had assessed that up to 3,000 of these workers would be redundant under any reasonable business plan, but had lacked the funds to make the required severance payments. It therefore accepted a bid based on the dubious premise that the entire workforce could be maintained. Shortly following transfer of title, the new owner dismissed 3,000 workers. Under Zambian law private owners are responsible for termination benefits of workers dismissed after sale; in this case the new owner has failed to make the required payments. Subsequently, the firm went out of business entirely, and the residual 4,000 workers are now in the same boat as the previously laid-off 3,000.
Understandably, worker and public reaction has been severely critical.
15 Three of the closed firms had long been non-operational prior to sale. 16 It is likely that there had been reductions in employee numbers prior to privatization, as part of reforms or in preparation for sale. In many countries around the world, the largest layoffs come well before a change of ownership. Thus, comparing employee numbers at the moment of privatization to some later point may underestimate the downsizing that occurred. 17 Itself subsequently privatized.
Overall, it is clear that employment in the mining sector has decreased by at least 7000 workers or 20 %. Assuming that the dismissal rate in the other affected mines was equal to that in the non-mining sector (28.5 %), this would amount to an additional 7700 layoffs, and a total reduction of workers in the privatized mining sector to around 19,000-and the fate of 10,000 of the remainder is in doubt, given the decision by AngloAmerican, in January of 2002, to pull out of the ZCCM copper mining operations it had purchased in 1999.
A digression is in order to sketch the sad story of copper in Zambia in the last decade. The highlights are: a persistent and precipitous fall in world copper prices, 18 a deep and costly politicization of the management and employment/procurement practices of the firm while an SOE; no investment in the sector for years prior to its sale; all this leading to Zambian production costs being among the highest in the world--resulting in losses on average of $15 million USD per month over the past five years of its existence as an SOE. Discussions to privatize the sector began in 1991, but despite supposedly powerful donor prodding, nothing substantial was sold until 1999. 19 The first serious effort to sell came in 1996-97. A fairly firm $1 billion USD offer (counting promised investments) was on the table from a consortium of experienced copper firms.
But responsibility for the transaction was removed from the respected Zambian Privatization Agency and handed over to a team of mine managers and former managers, many of whom had long opposed privatization. They rejected the offer and asked for much more, based on a book value calculation of the assets; the bidders walked away. Perhaps the counterfactual would have been worse? To repeat, the privatized firms, outside the severely depressed copper sector, have done quite well, almost certainly far better than they would have had they remained under government ownership--and this in a time of severe economic downturn in Zambia. In the mining sector, no one can defend the Luanshya/Baluba sale. But even the low-price and subsequently cancelled take over of the other ZCCM mines by Anglo-American has resulted in substantial investments that government would never have been able to make.
One can argue that perhaps these investments will serve as a foundation on which a subsequent owner can make the venture profitable (though clearly that was not the view of the highly experienced Anglo-American, which appears to have decided not to throw good money after bad).
Overall, the argument that any reasonable counterfactual would have resulted in inferior outcomes is fairly persuasive in the case of small and medium firms producing tradable goods--but much less convincing when large, relatively valuable firms are at issue. Certainly, the copper sector had been grossly mismanaged under state ownership, but it is evident that the privatization of the sector was poorly handled, both economically and socially. Zambians thus have legitimate reason to fear that the upcoming privatizations of major infrastructure firms could go wrong, given the non-transparent, efficiency and revenue decreasing manner that large firms have been divested in the past.
An anti-privatization argument of despair once made in Russia may apply in the Zambian case: Retaining firms in state hands means that any positive flow of resources generated will likely be largely siphoned off or wasted, depending on whether the managers and supervisors are venal or incompetent (or both). But privatization may be worse, as the revenues. But in the absence of a proper accounting the public is given license to speculate that not only these transactions were corrupt, but all others as well. 
Other African countries…
Is the Zambian case typical? Regarding the crucial issue of transparency, Table 5 presents the type and incidence of privatization methods employed in Africa. While no method is guaranteed to be free of manipulation and corruption, some methods are more transparent than others. The sale of shares through a public floatation is generally thought to be about the most transparent sales approach; but it has rarely been applied in Africa (outside of Nigeria and South Africa) in part because of the thin or embryonic nature of capital markets in most countries. Other methods can be designed to be competitive and transparent, such as tenders. But the ultimate transparency of the tender method depends on the honesty and competence of its administrators, to a greater extent than stock issuing. One cannot systematically link the method applied to the size or importance of 21 the relevant firm (though it is likely that only large firms were sold through public floatation). Buchs (2002) estimates in Table 6 the countries where obviously less transparent methods have accounted for a significant minority of sales. The numbers are sufficiently large to raise concerns, though no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Better news…
Summarizing other studies of African privatizations: Boubakri and Cosset (2002) looked at 16 privatizations on the continent of Africa (none in Zambia). Profitability rose and efficiency fell, both by slight percentages. Neither of these shifts was statistically significant, but there was a significant increase in capital expenditures in the divested firms. operating and financial performance of the divested firms. In both countries many commercial state firms had ceased operation before divestiture was contemplated; in both countries, three-fourths of such firms returned to productive activity following privatization. Substantial productivity gains were noted, due partly to reductions in the workforce, but also because of improved utilization of capacity. In most cases, investments, production, sales and value added increased sharply post-sale. "The overriding conclusion ….is that performance of privatized companies has met and even They reach even more upbeat conclusions concerning private provision of water in Abidjan, Ivory Coast (Ménard and Clarke, 2002, b) , where 30 years of private activity has resulted in very high levels of coverage-despite rapid population growth-an excellent quality of water and service, and declining prices for all consumers. Areas of concern are the decline of competitive bidding, the likelihood that the average price per m 3 could easily be even lower, and the fear that the flexible collaboration between government and private provider that lay at the heart of the Ivorian success in this venture will be destroyed by the political instability in the country since 1999.
IV. What is to be done?
The first conclusion is that privatization of manufacturing, industrial and service sectors, and especially the small and medium firms in these sectors, should proceed apace. The empirical record on the effects of privatization in Africa is not as dense and robust as it is in other regions. Still, accumulating evidence suggests that firms producing tradables do more for the shareholders, consumers, taxpayers and economy in private hands they than ever did under public ownership. A surprising amount of assets of this type remains in state hands in Africa; it should be divested without delay.
Utilities and infrastructure, banks, railroads, and the large natural resource producers are the tougher cases. The dilemma is evident: Retaining them in classic SOE form means more poor service and financial losses; privatizing them incorrectly can be economically and politically problematic. Wallsten's important conclusion 25 regarding telecommunications divestiture-ownership change per se does not produce efficiency gains, but ownership change combined with separate and independent regulation doesmust certainly apply to electricity and water and sewerage, given the lack in these sectors, compared to telecommunications, of technological change facilitating competition.
Thus, the medium-to long-term solution is to create and reinforce the institutional mechanisms that guide and regulate sales and market operations. Institutional improvements are required if African markets are to attract and retain good investors to manage, finance and own infrastructure services in ways that are beneficial to society while yielding a decent return on the capital and expertise expended. So, "institution building" programs--to enact the policy framework for and build implementation capacity in sales, regulatory and competition promotion agencies, to train the individual sellers and regulators, to empower and then isolate monitoring and enforcement agencies from political interference, to render contracts enforceable; all this would seem to be desirable. There is already much underway in these fields in Africa, most of it supported by the donor community. An examination of past initiatives to determine which were the more effective, why and under what circumstances, with suggestions on how to replicate the successful, might be of use.
Should this be the main thrust of reform efforts is questionable? Perhaps not. In 1996, a private firm was awarded a four-year management contract to handle water and sanitation services. Payment was in two parts: a set fee, and a bonus payment based on the achievement of stipulated performance targets. The provider agreed to submit periodic performance reports, on which the additional payment would be based.
The Palestinian Authority lacked the capacity to monitor the contract and especially the performance reports of the private provider. Fees for the guarantee are born by the investors. (Gupta et al., 2002) 6. To address the problem of small or deficient equity markets, the use of regional exchanges should be encouraged.
Finally, the external private sector might assist by offering guidelines on transparent procedures on the part of investors in privatization transactions, or more simply, by subscribing to, endorsing and help promulgating the promising "Business Principles for Countering Bribery" initiative of Transparency International.
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Outsourcing and the reliance on such external measures could, indeed should produce positive effects. But they will be politically sensitive or outrightly unacceptable to many in Africa, who are likely to regard them as further infringements of sovereignty, or further suggestions of African incompetence. Even if accepted, these are at best temporary, stopgap measures. The real answer lies in the internal evolution of the institutional and political frameworks, a process-to hammer home the point-that is not well understood but is, at the very least, time consuming. Donors can cajole and help, as they have done in Guinea and Gaza and elsewhere, but their effectiveness is less than the 26 There are no panaceas: A Swiss firm-SGS Holdings-contracted to handle some aspects of the corruption-ridden customs service in Pakistan is alleged to have bribed government officials in return for the contract, thus tainting the idea of outsourcing. 27 There is a cost in that the amount available for lending from the World Bank (or IDA) to the country is reduced by the amount guaranteed. That is, the sum guaranteed is nominally recorded as a World Bank loan. The country pays no fee and makes no payments (unless the guarantee is called and the Bank has had to pay the investor). 28 Launched in December 2002, with the assistance of a number of private firms including General Electric, Shell International and Rio Tinto, the principles "provide a framework for good business practices and risk management strategies for countering bribery." The summary document lists the areas where bribery and corruption are most prevalent in business operations-outright bribes, political contributions, charitable contributions and sponsorships, facilitation payments, gifts, hospitality and expenses-and states clearly the actions that participating firms will eschew. (Transparency International, 2002) 29 eternally optimistic statements they issue would lead one to think. The African privatization dilemma, at least for the largest, higher potential firms, is unresolved. 
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